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Appellant, Joel Evans, submits the following Reply Brief in response to Third
Party Defendant/appellee Salt Lake City Corporation's ("SLCC") Brief.
REPLY TO SLCC'S "RESPONSE TO MR EVANS STATEMENT OF FACTS"
In response to Evans' statement of facts, and in presenting a statement of
additional facts it argues is relevant, SLCC highlights certain facts and corrects aspects of
Evans' factual statements that it feels are incomplete or mischaracterizations. What
SLCC does not ever acknowledge, however, is the fact that, at all relevant times in
connection with this case, Educators acted as the administrator and agent of SLCC and
the disability plan SLCC sponsored for the benefit of its employees. Thefirstand second
statements of undisputed fact presented by Evans in this case, that SLCC maintained a
plan to provide disability benefits for its public safety employees and that SLCC
contracted with Educators to be the administrator for the plan, are undisputed. Likewise,
it is undisputed that SLCC, not Educators, was responsible for funding the benefits
provided under SLCC's plan. Record, p. 594. It was SLCC, not Educators, who bore the
risk when claims were paid in connection with disability benefits for public safety
employees.
Despite this reality, throughout its brief SLCC goes to great pains to distance itself
from Educators and to ignore the fact that every action taken by Educators in this case
was performed in its role as the agent of SLCC and its disability plan. See, e.g. p. 6
(there is "no allegation that the City had any participation in offsetting Mr. Evans' VA
benefits was at issue on summary judgment below... throughout his appellate brief, Mr.
Evans makes no factual allegation that the City had anything to do with the VA benefit
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offset"); p. 8 (Evans' citations to the Record refer to arguments raised against Educators,
not SLCC); p. 10 ("indeed, it is conceded by all parties that the offset was carried out by
Educators, not the City"); and p. 12 ("the City has never sued Mr. Evans"). Throughout
its brief, SLCC acts as if there is no connection between its own actions and the actions
of Educators in pursuing Evans.
ARGUMENT
I.

All Actions of Educators are Imputed to SLCC
The idea that SLCC is not answerable for the actions and errors of Educators is a

fundamental misperception of basic legal principles that apply to this case. Even a
cursory review of the allegations in Evans' Counterclaim against Educators and his Third
Party Complaint against SLCC make clear that Evans asserts claims against both
Educators and SLCC as agent and principal, respectively. There is no question that the
actions of an agent are imputed to its principal. Wardlev Better Homes and Gardens v.
Cannon, 2002 UT 99, ^16. There is no question that Educators was acting solely as an
agent for SLCC in everything that Educators did in connection with Mr. Evans.
Educators carried out its activities based on the terms of the disability plan sponsored by
SLCC for its public safety employees. Neither SLCC nor Educators denies this. Yet
SLCC seeks to disavow Educators in each of its arguments presented to this court.
SLCC may not distance itself from or disavow the actions of Educators when
Educators, as SLCC's agent, brought suit against Evans to recover an alleged over
payment made to him. Knowledge of an agent's filing of a legal action against another
party is imputed to the principal. Id., ^|20. Does SLCC assert that Educators' suit against
3

Evans to collect the alleged overpayment was taken independent of Educators'
obligations to act as the administrator of SLCC's disability plan? To ask the question is
to answer it. SLCC's primary strategy in its brief is to attempt to completely disassociate
itself from Educators. Under the facts of this case, that argument is without any merit.
SLCC's last argument that "the City has never sued Mr. Evans" must also be
rejected. SLCC Brief p. 12. In fact, SLCC, through its agent Educators, initiated this
lawsuit by suing Evans for an alleged overpayment of disability benefits. In response to
Evans' claim that SLCC directed Educators to sue Evans to recover the claimed
overpayment, SLCC asserts that Evans "cites no facts of record in support" of this
allegation "because there are no facts of any kind supporting this conclusory and
speculative assertion." SLCC Brief pp. 12-13. Does SLCC honestly expect this Court or
Evans to believe that Educators was acting solely in its own capacity in bringing suit
against Evans for the alleged overpayment? Is SLCC asserting that in bringing suit to
recover the claimed overpayment, Educators was acting outside the scope of its
responsibilities as administrator of the SLCC disability benefits plan? This is a
remarkable suggestion by SLCC. It has never made such a claim in this litigation. In
fact, its actions in the case to date demonstrate that SLCC appreciates Educators zealous
pursuit of SLCC's economic interests. For SLCC to now suggest that Educators' action
in suing Evans to recover the claimed overpayment was done without SLCC's knowledge
or authorization is simply incredible.

II.

None of Evans9 Claims on Appeal Fall Within the Scope of the UGIA
SLCC asserts that claims associated with issues of "statutory

compliance/interpretation" do not sound in contract and were properly dismissed in trial
court under Utah's Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"). SLCC Brief, p. 9. However,
it is clear that Evans' claim relating to the impropriety of Educators' offset of Evans' VA
benefits is directly related to whether Evans has received the full measure of the disability
benefits he is owed under SLCC's contract with him to provide those benefits. It is
undisputed that, as a police officer, Evans is entitled to benefits owed to public safety
workers as mandated by Utah Code Annotated § 49-21, et. seq. SLCC could have stayed
within the Utah State Retirement System framework to fulfill its statutory obligations.
But SLCC chose to self-fund those benefits and provide "substantially equivalent"
disability benefits to its public safety employees by contract as required under the
mandates of the Utah State statute. U.C.A. §49-9-102 (2001).
Evans asserts that SLCC's and Educator's VA benefit offset violates the statute
and the requirements of SLCC's disability benefit plan. SLCC fails to explain how this
claim by Evans falls under the UGIA. However, the UGIA is very clear in stating that it
does not apply to contract claims U.C.A. § 63-30d-301 states:
"Waivers of Immunity-Exceptions:
(l)(a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any
contractual obligation.
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations are not subject to the
requirements of sections 63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, or 63-30d-601."
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The Supreme Court has specifically indicated that where employment contracts
involving governmental employees are being adjudicated, "a plaintiff who asserts a
contract claim against a governmental entity need not file a notice of claim in order to
vest a court with the subject matter of jurisdiction." Canfield v. Lavton City, 2005 UT
60, Tf 12. Moreover, Educators, SLCC's agent, acknowledged that the plan under which
disability benefits were being provided to Evans is a contract and should be governed
under contractual laws. Record at 73-75. It is noteworthy that SLCC cites no cases in
support of its argument that Evans' claims fall within the UGIA.
III.

Evans is Not Barred From Appealing the Trial Court's Arbitration Ruling

SLCC asserts that Evans is barred from raising arguments against arbitration
because they were raised for the first time in opposition to SLCC's Motion for Summary
Judgment. SLCC Brief pp. 10-11. This is an odd argument.
SLCC appears to assert that Evans had some obligation to anticipate and raise in
his Third Party Complaint SLCC's assertion that arbitration was the only method by
which Evans could challenge his denial of disability benefits. However, this is an
unwarranted and illogical argument. At the time Evans brought his Counterclaim against
Educators and his Third Party Complaint against SLCC, Evans was being sued by
SLCC's agent, Educators. Nothing in that context would suggest to Evans in drafting his
Counter claim and Third Party Complaint that SLCC would assert as a defense that
arbitration was the proper forum to resolve the parties' dispute. Evans was defending
against a lawsuit (rather than a claim in arbitration) brought against him by SLCC's
agent, Educators. Evans had no reason to believe that arbitration would be the proper
6

forum for resolution of the disputes arising out of the disability benefits plan when he
drafted his Third Party Complaint. Consequently, the argument that Evans was somehow
acting improperly in raising his arbitration arguments for the first time in opposition to
SLCC's Motion for Summary Judgment makes no sense.
SLCC next asserts that Evans "failed to exhaust the claims review process"
required by SLCC's disability plan. SLCC Brief p. 12. Again, SLCC improperly and
artificially focuses only narrowly on Evans' opposition to SLCC's Motion for Summary
Judgment and fails to acknowledge the reality that all arguments presented in the
underlying case are attributable and imputed to SLCC through the actions and arguments
of its agent, Educators. In fact, Evans argues that he acted in good faith in attempting to
comply with and exhaust any claims review process required under the SLCC disability
benefits plan. However, this was thwarted by the unreasonable and improper actions of
Educators and SLCC in the claims review process. SLCC should not be allowed to argue
that Evans failed to exhaust the claims review process when its agent, Educators, hedged
up the way for Evans to go through that process.
SLCC argues that it "...does not 'seek,' nor has it ever 'sought,' arbitration in this
matter." SLCC Brief p. 13. But this is simply a quibble. In fact, SLCC has argued that
Evans' claim in litigation must be dismissed for failure to satisfy the requirements of
SLCC's review and appeal process. As part of that process, SLCC contends that
arbitration is mandatory. Evans has asserted that he was improperly denied a reasonable
claims review and appeal process and that, given the actions of SLCC, through its agent,
Educators, in pursuing and continuing to pursue this litigation against Evans, SLCC has

waived any right that may have otherwise existed to require that Evans arbitrate his
claims. The argument has been properly presented and briefed by Evans on one side and
by SLCC and its agent, Educators, on the other.
DATED this J~_ day of July, 2010.
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